Many organizations appoint process owners without giving them the means to own the process, and in my view that is one of the main reasons BPM programs stall at Level 3. In a study of 299 organizations, about a third had established process-specific roles. Fewer than one in five had gone further and set up systematic performance monitoring, incentives or integrated management, and more investment rarely closes that gap.
A Record-to-Report process owner in a mid-sized group illustrates the problem. She has the title, a process map and a seat on the BPM steering committee. She can see that one business unit closes three days later than the others and that its intercompany balances never reconcile on the first pass.
She has little power to change any of this. The unit’s CFO decides how the unit closes. Its cost data follows a different structure from the rest of the group, so she cannot compare it, and her bonus depends on her own department’s budget rather than on group close time. On the organization chart she owns the process, but in practice she can only observe it. Her situation is common, and it usually reflects how the role was set up rather than her own ability.
Most organizations have the structures but lack the conditions
ZHAW School of Management and Law and BOC Group (2025) surveyed 299 organizations in Germany, Austria and Switzerland, 45% of them with more than 1,000 employees, and asked them to place themselves on a seven-step scale. The answers cluster in the middle of the scale:
20% Only individual processes considered
18% Enterprise-wide process management being planned or introduced
25% Enterprise-wide process map; business-critical processes identified
15% Process-specific roles established; process management strategically positioned
3% Process performance systematically monitored
5% Culture of continuous improvement, incl. instruments and incentives
9% Process management integrated with other management disciplines
Only 17% have moved beyond establishing roles. These organizations monitor process performance systematically, have an improvement culture backed by incentives or have integrated process management with other management disciplines. Most of the others have built process maps, identified their critical processes and in some cases appointed roles. The same study finds that only 14% use even descriptive process analytics, and the respondents most often cite missing data as the reason.
The figures have some limitations. The sample is regional, so the shares may differ elsewhere. Most respondents are BPM professionals, and only 16% are process owners themselves. The finding that maturity barely changed between the 2023 and 2025 survey waves comes from BOC Group’s own summary (BOC Group, 2026), and it compares two snapshots rather than following the same organizations over time.
Lack of commitment does not explain the stagnation. These organizations invest in BPM, and 91% of them model their processes. They have the roles, but they mostly lack the data and the incentives that would make the roles work.
Level 3 is where the stall happens
Maturity models describe the same climb in five steps: ad hoc, documented, standardized, measured and continuously improving. OMG’s BPMM and Rosemann and de Bruin’s model follow it, and Hammer’s PEMM is usually read the same way.
Figure 1: The Five Levels of BPM Maturity
Roughly four in five organizations sit at Level 3 or below. The percentages in Figure 1 are my own approximate mapping of the ZHAW data onto this scale, so they should be read as orders of magnitude.
The models describe where organizations are but say little about why they get stuck. Systematic reviews (Röglinger et al., 2012; Tarhan et al., 2016) point out that they offer little guidance on moving from one level to the next.
A process owner without authority remains part of the infrastructure
Getting to Level 3 is mostly a matter of building governance infrastructure, such as documentation, process architectures, assigned roles and a process management function. Organizations usually get there through sustained investment in frameworks and centers of excellence.
Getting to Level 4 requires the infrastructure to work. A process owner who lacks end-to-end visibility, cross-functional decision rights and incentives tied to process outcomes belongs to the infrastructure, and no working governance stands behind the title.
The same gap appears in other cross-functional processes. In Procure-to-Pay, procurement is measured on price variance, finance on processing cost and operations on delivery reliability, which gives one process several metrics and nobody accountable for the whole. In Order-to-Cash, bringing down days-sales-outstanding usually requires coordinated changes across functions whose KPIs pull in different directions.
Maturity assessments measure the wrong axis
Standard maturity assessments check whether governance exists. They ask whether there is a documented process map, whether a process owner has been formally assigned and whether there is a BPM governance framework.
Most of them rarely check whether the owner can act on any of it. Hammer’s PEMM (2007) is a notable exception, since it rates the owner’s authority as part of process maturity. The questions the other assessments leave out concern whether the owner sees integrated data from every contributing function, can authorize changes across functions and has incentives linked to end-to-end outcomes.
When both dimensions are placed on one grid, it becomes clear where an organization, or a single process, actually stands. The matrix below is my own diagnostic framework, informed by the literature and studies listed at the end.
Figure 2: Process Governance Diagnostic Matrix
The horizontal axis shows governance infrastructure, meaning the quality and completeness of documentation, formal roles and frameworks. The vertical axis shows governance operationality, meaning how far the process owner has end-to-end performance insight, authority across functional lines and incentives aligned with process KPIs.
Many large organizations with established BPM programs appear to sit in the bottom-right cell, with strong infrastructure and weak operationality.
In this stagnation zone, more investment buys more infrastructure and very little extra control. Better documentation, more defined roles and improved frameworks leave authority, information flows and incentives where they were. Because most assessments measure mainly the horizontal axis, organizations tend to underdiagnose the problem and spend their remediation effort in the wrong place.
The pattern has been documented for more than 25 years
Hammer and Stanton (1999) described companies that had redesigned their processes but kept their functional management structures, leaving employees caught between the two. The companies that made the change work appointed strong managers as process owners, gave them real authority over work and budgets, and moved measurement and compensation from unit goals to process goals.
Dechow and Mouritsen (2005) showed why integrated systems do not solve the problem on their own. In a study of two companies, they found that an ERP system does not deliver integration once and for all. The system makes some parts of the operation visible and leaves blind spots elsewhere, which people then bridge with local spreadsheets and side systems. Control, they concluded, is something people achieve together across functions, and the system cannot provide it on its own. A process owner faces exactly this visibility problem.
Appointing process owners is the easy part. Creating the authority the appointment was supposed to bring is much harder, and the ZHAW figures show the result, with roles common and systematic performance monitoring rare.
Three questions test whether a process owner can own the process
Three yes-or-no questions show whether a process owner can actually own the process. I would ask them before committing more investment to any major end-to-end process.
The first question is whether the process owner receives integrated performance data spanning all contributing functions, at least monthly. An owner who cannot see the whole process cannot manage it. Without a consolidated view of cycle time, error rates and cost across functions, the owner has nothing to steer by. Many maturity assessments check that metrics exist, but not whether they are integrated and regularly available to the owner. In the ZHAW study, only 3% of organizations place themselves at the stage where process performance is systematically monitored.
Integrated data also depends on shared definitions. Cost centres, organizational dimensions and master data need to be consistent across units, or the owner receives figures that cannot be compared, however good the reporting tool is.
The second question is whether the process owner can authorize an improvement that changes more than one function without each function head’s separate approval. If every cross-functional initiative needs sign-off from each function head, the owner works as a coordinator. In my experience, this is where process-oriented change most often stops, because no single function can say yes on behalf of the others.
The third question is whether the process owner’s formal performance evaluation includes at least one end-to-end process KPI with meaningful weight. Effort follows what is rewarded, so an owner evaluated on functional results will optimize functional results. If the role’s evaluation has no KPI tied to outcomes such as end-to-end cycle time or total cost per transaction, the incentive link is broken. In the ZHAW data, only 5% of organizations name an improvement culture backed by incentives as their current stage.
The idea is old. Kerr’s classic 1975 paper, “On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B,” describes organizations that reward functional performance (A) while hoping for cross-functional outcomes (B). Vroom’s expectancy theory (1964) calls the missing link instrumentality, meaning the belief that performing well will actually be rewarded.
If the answer to any of these questions is no, the role has been formally assigned but lacks structural support. In that case the organization has created a governance artifact without a governance mechanism behind it.
The questions should be asked for each process separately, because the answers differ. An organization can govern Procure-to-Pay well, with integrated data, cross-functional authority and aligned incentives, while Record-to-Report stays fragmented and high-risk.
The order of the preconditions matters more than the size of the budget
Before the next BPM investment, I would check whether the process owners have integrated data, cross-functional authority and aligned incentives, or mainly a job title. If it is mainly the title, a more capable owner or a more sophisticated framework will not help much, and the organization needs to build the preconditions in a particular order.
Measurement comes first, because an owner cannot exercise authority over what they cannot see, and decision rights without integrated data turn into escalations based on opinion. Authority comes next, since an owner who can see the process also needs the right to act on it across functional lines. Incentives come last. Tying someone’s evaluation to outcomes they can neither see nor influence feels arbitrary and erodes trust in the role, while the same incentives work once visibility and authority are in place.
This order is a hypothesis that has not been tested. It follows from a simple causal logic, in which each step depends on the one before it.
Investing in the wrong order mostly produces more of what organizations already have, namely well-designed roles that cannot perform. For an organization at Level 3, the practical consequence is that the next investment should go to integrated data for the process owner before anything else.
References
BOC Group (2026). GPM-Trends 2026 (summary of the 2023–2025 comparison). Link
Dechow, N., & Mouritsen, J. (2005). Enterprise resource planning systems, management control and the quest for integration. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 30(7–8), 691–733.
Hammer, M. (2007). The process audit. Harvard Business Review, 85(4), 111–123.
Hammer, M., & Stanton, S. (1999). How process enterprises really work. Harvard Business Review, 77(6), 108–118.
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management Journal, 18(4), 769–783.
Object Management Group (2008). Business Process Maturity Model (BPMM), Version 1.0.
Röglinger, M., Pöppelbuß, J., & Becker, J. (2012). Maturity models in business process management. Business Process Management Journal, 18(2), 328–346.
Rosemann, M., & de Bruin, T. (2005). Towards a business process management maturity model. Proceedings of ECIS 2005.
Tarhan, A., Turetken, O., & Reijers, H. A. (2016). Business process maturity models: A systematic literature review. Information and Software Technology, 75, 122–134.
Vroom, V. H. (1964). Work and Motivation. Wiley.
ZHAW School of Management and Law & BOC Group (2025). Business Process Management Studie 2025 (Geppert, T., Pecher, J., Oehninger, F., Scheppler, B., Meentken, F., & Gerussi, S.). N=299.




